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Introduction
This paper shows that the risk-bearing capacity of U.S. securities brokers and dealers is a strong determinant of risk premia in commodity markets. Commodity related derivatives are the principal means by which producers and consumers of commodities hedge the price risk of their physical positions. This risk is often termed "non-marketable" as transaction costs make the trading of physical commodities unattractive to …nancial investors. Since the majority of commodity derivatives are bilateral over-the-counter (OTC) contracts between a client and a …nancial intermediary, broker-dealers play a key role in the hedging process.
I capture the limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) in this market by deriving a simple asset pricing model where producers and consumers of commodities share risk with broker-dealers who are subject to funding constraints.
In equilibrium, the price of aggregate commodity risk decreases in the relative leverage of the broker-dealer sector. I estimate the model in the cross-section of individual commodities and …nd strong empirical support for its predictions.
Fluctuations in risk-bearing capacity have particularly strong forecasting power for energy returns, both in-sample and out-of-sample.
Broker-dealers are leveraged …nancial institutions, such as investment banks, who "buy and sell securities for a fee, hold an inventory of securities for resale, or do both." 1 1 mented markets suggests that the pricing implications of time-varying e¤ective risk aversion are largest when broker-dealers are predominantly on one side of the market. 2 Following this literature, I argue that the e¤ective risk aversion of brokerdealers determines risk premia in commodity derivatives because broker-dealers are, to a large extent, the marginal investor on the speculative side of the market.
The importance of broker-dealers stems from the high degree of intermediation required to funnel …nancial investor capital into commodities. Unlike stocks, bonds and other securities, the trading of many physical commodities involves signi…cant transportation and storage costs as well as possible informational asymmetries
(such as quality concerns), which discourage …nancial investors from engaging in physical commodity transactions in the marketplace. To bypass these market imperfections, commodity price risk can be securitized and traded via derivatives that reference physical commodities. A brief overview of this market is provided below.
Market for Commodity Derivatives
There are two broad categories of commodity derivatives: exchange-traded derivatives and OTC derivatives. Exchange-traded derivatives include futures and options traded in exchanges such as the New York Mercantile Exchange and Chicago
Mercantile Exchange. While in principle any investor can buy or sell these securities, the large notional sizes of futures contracts and the perceived riskiness of commodities have traditionally discouraged retail and institutional investors alike.
Only recently have investable commodity indexes and exchange traded funds made the asset class more accessible to a broader class of investors. Unlike standardized contracts traded in exchanges, OTC derivatives (such as forwards, swaps, and options) are tailored to suit the needs of individual investors.
In OTC transactions clients bargain directly with broker-dealers who are the market makers in these derivatives. Upon reaching an agreement, the broker-dealer may hold the commodity risk on its trading book until it receives an o¤setting OTC position, or it may hedge its net exposure using an exchange-traded derivative or another OTC contract. In addition to the price risk associated with pure market making, most commodity traders take on commodity risk by choosing not to hedge their books or by holding entirely speculative positions. Some larger broker-dealers even speculate by holding outright positions in physical commodities.
The overwhelming size of the OTC market relative to the exchange-traded market highlights the importance of broker-dealer capital for the functioning of commodity derivatives markets. As such, the premium that hedgers are required to pay for insurance against commodity price risk is likely to be a¤ected by the e¤ective risk aversion of broker-dealers. To the extent that hedgers'demand for insurance is independent of broker-dealers'risk constraints, broker-dealers'e¤ec-tive risk aversion can be expected to impact the equilibrium returns on commodity derivatives. 4 Absence of arbitrage across derivatives markets implies that the risk premia of OTC transactions are also incorporated in the returns on exchangetraded derivatives. 5 
Theoretical and Empirical Strategy
I formalize the link between broker-dealer risk-bearing capacity and security risk premia by deriving a simple asset pricing model where risk-constrained brokerdealers provide insurance to households who wish to hedge their positions in physical commodities. Broker-dealer leverage is limited by a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint, which caps the probability of insolvency. 6 In equilibrium, the required return on a security depends on its comovement with the market portfolio, but also on its residual comovement with the aggregate portfolio of physical commodities. I refer to the latter as the aggregate non-marketable portfolio. Thus, there is an additional systematic risk factor-the return on the aggregate non-marketable portfolio-which determines security returns in addition to the market risk factor.
The premium per unit of non-marketable risk is pinned down by the economy's e¤ective risk aversion. I show that the e¤ective risk aversion varies over time with the tightness of broker-dealers'risk constraints and it can be expressed as a function of aggregate balance sheet components of broker-dealers and households.
This innovation allows me to estimate the model using aggregate balance sheet data from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts.
The model predicts that, controlling for market risk, the measure of e¤ec-tive risk aversion forecasts returns on securities that co-move with the aggregate non-marketable portfolio. Since the market risk adjusted returns of di¤erent securities load di¤erently on the non-marketable risk factor, the model also delivers a cross-sectional prediction for the magnitude and direction of the forecasting dealers'e¤ective risk aversion. 5 Due to poor availability of OTC forwards data, the empirical section uses data on futures contracts. 6 Adrian and Shin (2008c) provide a micro foundation for this constraint from a moral hazard problem between borrowers and lenders. 4 relationship. The empirical section of the paper tests these predictions for 14 commodity futures, two investable commodity indexes, and other securities.
Related Literature
This paper builds on two broad strands of literature: the literature on …nancial market frictions and asset prices as well as the extensive literature on the determinants of commodity prices.
The idea that the risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs is limited and has consequences for asset prices originates in the work on limits of arbitrage pioneered by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) are among the …rst to relate arbitrageurs'inability to exploit price di¤erences to endogenous balance sheet constraints. The speci…c funding constraints analyzed in this paper build on the work of Adrian and Shin (2008a,b,c) who demonstrate that the active management of …nancial intermediary balance sheets generates procyclical leverage, which has consequences for asset prices. My …nding that the risk-bearing capacity of broker-dealers determines risk premia in commodity markets is most similar in spirit to the …nding of Adrian, Etula and The literature on the determinants of expected commodity returns can be roughly divided into two groups. The …rst group uses the CAPM to argue that the expected return on commodity holdings is compensation for systematic risk.
Early studies include Black (1976) and Breeden (1980) who explain the variation in futures prices by systematic risk that stems from changes in economic state variables. Tests of these models …nd scant evidence in the data, as shown by Jagannathan (1985) and a number of other studies. More recently, Bessembinder and Chan (1992) …nd that the same variables that forecast market returnse.g., dividend yield, interest rate, and yield spread -also forecast commodity returns. This suggests that time-varying risk premia in commodities could be driven by macro-economic forces that determine asset allocation. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) argue that commodity futures, as an asset class, provide a risk-return pro…le that is comparable to that of equities.
The second group of studies argues that the expected return of holding com- In addition to the literature on limits of arbitrage, the model has similarities with the large behavioral …nance literature on noise trader risk (e.g. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999) , and market making (e.g. Grossman and Miller, 1988; Kyle, 1985) .
It is also consistent with Du¢ e and Strulovici's (2009) model of limited capital mobility where higher costs of intermediation increase return volatility and prolong temporary risk premia. Overall, the distinguishing feature of the current theoretical framework is its ability to generate time-varying e¤ective risk aversion without restrictive assumptions on the behavior of passive traders. By focusing on the actions of risk-constrained …nancial institutions, the model is also distinctly di¤erent from the consumption-based models that generate time-varying risk aversion through, for instance, habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Chan and Kogan, 2002) .
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a simple theoretical model, which introduces risk-constrained broker-dealers in an equilibrium pricing model for commodities. Section 3 estimates the model in the data and conducts robustness checks. Section 4 digs deeper into energy commodities and o¤ers a discussion of the 2008 run-up in energy prices. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
As discussed above, there is an extensive literature that relates commodity risk premia to two components: systematic marketable risk and commodity-speci…c hedging pressure. 7 The latter arises from risks that agents cannot, or do not want 
Each position is expressed as a fraction of the agent's …nancial wealth, e j t . 7 For instance, de Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000). 8
Funding Constrained Broker-Dealers
Suppose broker-dealers (bd) are risk neutral but subject to risk constraints, which ensure that each dealer's equity e bd t is su¢ ciently large to cover their Value at Risk (V aR t ). 8 Broker-dealers trade only marketable securities. That is, they tend to shy away from direct purchases and sales of physical commodities because of aforementioned costs associated with such transactions. Thus, the return on broker-dealer equity derives from positions in marketable assets and forwards:
Each broker-dealer chooses its portfolio to maximize expected return on equity, subject to the VaR constraint,
By risk neutrality, the risk constraint binds with equality, determining the leverage of the dealer's portfolio. If V aR t is some multiple of equity volatility e bd t q V ar t r bd t+1 , the constraint becomes q V ar t r bd t+1
1 . The Lagrangian is:
, and use the binding VaR constraint q V ar t r bd t+1 = 1 to obtain the FOC:
This characterizes the broker-dealer's optimal portfolio choice.
Note that equation (2:2) is identical to the standard mean-variance choice but with the risk-aversion parameter replaced by t , the Lagrange multiplier associated with the risk constraint scaled by the constant . In other words, broker-dealers are risk-neutral but behave as if they were risk-averse. As the risk constraint binds harder, the shadow price t increases, and leverage must be reduced. The scaled Lagrange multiplier t measures the e¤ective risk aversion of broker-dealers. Plugging the broker-dealers'portfolio choice (2:2) in the binding VaR constraint, one obtains:
That is, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the risk constraint is proportional to the generalized Sharpe ratio for the set of risky securities traded in the market as a whole.
Risk Averse Households
Suppose the rest of the investors are risk averse households (hh). They trade o¤ mean against variance in the portfolio return, which depends on the returns on marketable assets, forwards, and non-marketable assets:
Households choose positions in marketable securities to solve:
:
, one obtains the optimal portfolio choice:
Market Portfolio
Since forwards contracts are in zero net supply, market clearing implies: 
If the market portfolio is e¢ cient in the sense that it satis…es the FOCs (2:2) and 
where
t r t+1 is the return on the market porfolio, is the vector of aggregate non-marketable positions in the economy. Note that the aggregates in (2:6) and (2:7) are wealth-weighted combinations of the two investor groups'respective variables.
Equilibrium Returns
denote security i's beta with the portfolio of marketable assets, the expression (2:5) for equilibrium returns can be rewritten as:
The second line de…nes:
which is interpreted as the excess return on the aggregate production-weighted portfolio of N on-M arketable securities. Here non-marketable securities are physical commodities, and hence r N M t+1 is the excess spot return on a portfolio of commodities weighted by world production values. The equilibrium of the model is summarized in:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Returns). The risk premium of security i depends on its comovement with the aggregate portfolio of marketable assets and its comovement with the aggregate portfolio of non-marketable assets:
| {z } However, it is possible that e¢ cient inventory management (basis arbitrage) by holders of physical commodities keeps the excess returns on some cash commodities close to the returns on the corresponding nearby forwards contracts. 9 Hence, the equilibrium pricing predictions of the model may carry over to some spot returns.
Empirical Implementation
Proposition 1 states that security risk premia are determined by two systematic risk components: one that stems from aggregate marketable risk and another that stems from aggregate non-marketable risk. I can test the empirical validity of the proposition by estimating (2:10) for individual securities returns. To do this, I
assume constant conditional variances and covariances, replace the expectations in by realizations, and add a constant to obtain: and (2:9) in the broker-dealer's FOC (2:2):
Using the de…nition of the market portfolio and de…ning
, the above simpli…es to: 
By balance sheet identity, the value of risky securities holdings of investor j must equal the value of equity plus the value of debt:
which implies that one can de…ne the …nancial leverage of broker-dealers and households as:
and the aggregate …nancial leverage is given by:
Using this notation, substitute (2:14) into (2:12) to obtain: 
where r i t+1 is the excess return on security i, and r M t+1 is the excess return on the market. This is the main regression speci…cation to be estimated in Section 3.2.
A potential caveat of the measure of e¤ective risk aversion in (2:17) is the implicit assumption that one can always infer broker-dealers'risk-bearing capacity from their level of leverage. In reality, however, this assumption may not hold.
For instance, it is conceivable that there are frictions in the market that do not allow broker-dealers to adjust leverage instantaneously in response to changes in risk constraints. One such potential friction is market illiquidity, which limits the broker-dealer's ability to rapidly buy and sell large quantities of securities in the marketplace. In the presence of such frictions, tighter risk constraints may coincide with high but decreasing leverage as broker-dealers strive to decrease the size of their balance sheets. Similarly, more permissive funding conditions may coincide with low but increasing leverage as broker-dealers look for ways to put their increased balance sheet capacity to work.
Thus, it is possible that one may not be able to accurately infer the level of e¤ective risk aversion from the levels of balance sheet variables. Yet, one might be able to capture changes in e¤ective risk aversion, or at least the direction of these changes, from observable balance sheet dynamics. To investigate this possibility, Section 3.2 also implements the following speci…cation:
is the …rst di¤erence in (2:17).
Cross-Section
In order to test the cross-sectional prediction of the model (Corollary 1), I compute the model-predicted loadings on 
Empirical Results
The previous section provided a simple theoretical justi…cation for the link between the tightness of broker-dealer risk constraints and the economy's e¤ective 11 Recall that the weights of the non-marketable portfolio r 
Data
The empirical analysis focuses on the futures and spot returns of four energy commodities (crude oil, heating oil, gasoline and natural gas), four metals (copper, silver, platinum, gold), and six agricultural commodities (sugar, cotton, corn, soybeans, cocoa, and wheat). 12 The individual commodities were selected based on their respective world production quantities and the liquidity of futures contracts.
I also use data on two investable commodity futures indexes (S&P Goldman Sachs
Commodity Index and Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index). The price data on individual commodities and commodity indexes are obtained from Bloomberg and
Datastream. Excess spot returns are generated by subtracting the 3-Month Treasury Bill rate from the total quarterly returns. Since positions in futures contracts are "pure bets" in the sense that they require no investment outlays, excess futures returns are given simply by percentage price changes. To ensure liquidity, I
compute quarterly returns from rolling front-month contracts.
13 12 Due to poor availability of data on OTC forwards, I use data on futures contracts instead. By absence of arbitrage, futures returns can be expected to re ‡ect the risk premia of OTC contracts. 13 The one-month excess return at the end of month t is given by I also use supplementary data on equity returns, bond returns, bond yields and where F t 1;T is the futures price at the end of month t 1 on the nearest contract whose expiration date T is after the end of month t, and F t;T is the price of the same contract at the end of month t. The quarterly return is the product of three monthly returns. 14 Since the leverage (assets/equity) of the broker-dealer sector exceeds the leverage of households, the measure of^ 
Cross-Sectional Analysis
The time-series results in Table 1 20 The common predictors include the VIX volatility index, interest rate, yield spread, dividend yield, and in ‡ation rate. The commodity speci…c predictors include the futures basis and hedging pressure. 21 For wheat, the coe¢ cient of e¤ective risk aversion is signi…cant across all speci…cations and its magnitude increases from 4:6 to 7:2 as one adds the full set of controls. For crude oil, the level of e¤ective risk aversion seems to be dominated by the change in risk aversion, which is highly signi…cant across all speci…cations. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is also robust to the addition of controls; it stays above 8:2 in all speci…cations. These results suggest that the information contained in the measure of e¤ective risk aversion is quite di¤erent from the information content of existing predictors.
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The results also demonstrate that few controls help predict commodity returns beyond the measure of e¤ective risk aversion: For crude oil, only lagged hedging pressure is statistically signi…cant; and for wheat, only lagged VIX and lagged hedging pressure are signi…cant. One might suspect that multicollinearity causes part of the observed insigni…cance of control variables. However, comparing the adjusted R 2 across di¤erent speci…cations suggests that only the statistically signi…cant controls contribute materially to the power of the regressions. 23 
Focus on Energy
In order to dig deeper in the link between e¤ective risk aversion and risk premia, this subsection narrows the scope of investigation by focusing on energy returns. I will …rst investigate the emergence of return forecastability. I will then study the robustness of the forecasting relationship out-of-sample. Finally, I will examine the extent to which my measure of e¤ective risk aversion can explain the large ‡uctuations of energy prices in 2008-2009. While the primary focus is on crude oil, the qualitative results obtain also for heating oil, gasoline, and the GSCI, which has a high weight on energy.
Emergence of Return Forecastability
I use rolling regressions to investigate the predictive power of e¤ective risk aversion over time. Since the trading of crude oil futures began only in 1983, I can Second, the forecasting ability of e¤ective risk aversion has increased steadily over time. To put the growth into perspective, the …gure also plots the fraction of broker-dealer assets relative to the sum of broker-dealer and household assets over time. It may not be surprising that the forecasting ability of broker-dealer risk appetite has increased along with the relative value of assets managed by the broker-dealer sector -but what is quite striking, the two variables have also grown at the same rate as indicated by the parallel trend lines. Taken together, these two …nding lend support to the stability of the forecasting relationship over time.
Out-of-Sample Forecasts
As is well known, the high in-sample forecasting power of a regressor does not guarantee robust out-of sample performance, which is more sensitive to misspeci…cation problems. To investigate the extent to which my measure of e¤ective risk aversion survives this tougher test, the following tests the forecastability of energy returns out of sample. In order to avoid look-ahead bias in constructing the regressor, I proxy e¤ective risk aversion by the quarterly changes in (2:17), without detrending the series. I use recursive regressions with the out-of-sample portion starting in the third quarter of 1995. Table 3 compares the predictive power of e¤ective risk aversion to three benchmarks (restricted models) that are standard in the literature of out-of-sample forecasting: 24 (1) random walk, (2) random walk with drift, and (3) …rst-order autoregression. These benchmarks are nested in the "unrestricted"speci…cations, which allows one to evaluate their performance using the Clark and West (2006) The results in Table 3 show that the models with e¤ective risk aversion outperform all three benchmarks at 1% signi…cance level. The strength of these out-of-sample results lends additional support to the robustness of the forecasting relationship over time. The estimation of the model in the data lends strong support to its theoretical predictions, both in the time-series and in the cross-section of commodity futures.
My …nding that risk constraints of broker-dealers are hardwired to risk premia in commodity derivatives has also implications for policy makers. Speci…cally, the paper shows how restrictions on broker-dealer trading activities can be expected to increase the costs of hedging for producers and consumers of commodities. This result will be central to understanding why restrictions on speculation by market makers may adversely impact the functioning of many derivatives markets.
In sum, the empirical and theoretical contributions of this paper may be regarded as …rst steps toward quantifying the asset pricing implications of limits of arbitrage in the broker-dealer sector. A plenty of research beckons in exploring this hypothesis in other derivatives markets and asset classes. Table 2B : Robustness Checks (Wheat)
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The dependent variable is the per-quarter excess return on wheat futures. Forecasting variables are the lagged level and the lagged change in e¤ective risk aversion. Control variables (each lagged by one quarter) are: the VIX implied volatility of the S&P 500, the 3-month U.S. treasury bill rate, the yield spread (di¤erence between Moody's Aaa corporate yield and the treasury rate), the S&P 500 dividend yield, the U.S. in ‡ation, the basis (future price over spot price), and the hedging pressure 
